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THE RELATION OF THE DIRECTORS TO THE COR-
PORATION AND THE STOCKHOLDERS
The books are replete with loose and conflicting definitions of
the term director. On the one hand we find many cases which
hold that the directors of a corporation are trustees for the stock-
holders. On the other hand there are some cases holding that
directors are mere agents of the corporation and the principles
of the law of agency are applicable to them. Briggs vs. Spaulding,
141 U. S. 132. Opposed to both these views is the view that the
directors are neither trustees nor agents, but are in the position
of managing partners appointed to fill that position by a mutual
arrangement between all the shareholders. Automatic, etc., Syn-
dicate Co., Ltd. vs. Cunninghame, L. R. (19o6) 2 Ch. Div. 34.
Wormser in his text says that directors are not trustees in the
technical sense of the word. These definitions lead to the con-
clusion that the relation of directors to the corporation and the
stockholders is a distinct fiduciary relation partaking of the ele-
ments of both trusts and agency. This peculiar relation which
the directors bear to the corporation and the shareholders arises
out of the inability of the corporation to act (with reference to
ordinary business) except through the directors, and in this sense
they are the agents of the corporation; while on the other hand as
to the ordinary and usual business of the corporation, the directors
are supreme and can do acts contrary to the wishes of the stock-
holders and in this sense they are trustees.
Referring to the duties of directors, a federal judge once said:
"The idea is not to be tolerated that they serve as merely gilded
ornaments of the institution, to enhance its attractiveness, or that
their reputations should be used as a lure to customers." Gibbons
vs. Anderson, 8o Fed. 345. But the cases are uniform in holding
that the directors can perform only such services as are within
the usual and ordinary business of the corporation. Commercial
Nat. Bank vs. Wienhard, 192 U. S. 243; Railway Co. vs. Allerton,
18 Wall. 233; People ex rel. Manice vs. Powell, 2O1 N. Y. x94,
94 N. E. 634; Goetz vs. Knie, 103 Wis. 366.
By the great weight of authority, with reference to the ordinary
and usual business, the directors are required to exercise ordinary
care and prudence, which is the care and prudence that reasonable
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men exercise under similar circumstances. Vide Coggs vs. Bern-
ard, i Salk. 26; Briggs vs. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132; Hun vs.
Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37 Am. Rep. 564; Swentzel vs. Penn Bank, 147
Pa. St. 140, 23 Ati. 405; Johnson vs. Stoughton Wagon Co., 118
Wis. 438. They are not responsible for loss resulting to their
corporation from mere mistakes of judgment, where they have
acted in good faith, within their authority and have exercised
reasonable diligence and prudence. Yates vs. Jones National Bank,
206 U. S. 158. Nor are they insurers of the fidelity of the agents
whom they have appointed, unless they have neglected to exercise
ordinary care in the appointment of the agents. Morawetz, sec-
tions 151 et. seq. The law is well settled in Wisconsin by the case
of North Hudson, etc., Loan Assn. vs. Childs, 82 Wisconsin 460,
476, 52 N. W. 6oo, in which Justice Pinney said: "* * * and
the degree of care they (directors) are bound to exercise is that
which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in respect to a like gratuitous employment,
regard being had to the usages of business and the circumstances
of each particular case; that they are not liable, in the absence of
fraud or intentional breach of trust, for negligence, mistakes of
judgment, and bad management in making investments on doubt-
ful or insufficient security."
Directors are, however, liable for loss resulting to the corpora-
tion from their own fraud, embezzlement or wilful misconduct.
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. ii, io Am. Rep. 6 8 4,
What constitutes culpable negligence is never the same for all
cases. As is said by the court in First Nat. Bank vs. Ocean Na-
tional Bank, 6o N. Y. 278, the degree of care required depends
upon the particular objects to which it is to be applied. Manifestly
the degree of care required in case of a quantity of iron would
not be the same as that degree of care required in case of a valuable
jewel. General Rubber Co. vs. Benedict, 215 N. Y. 18.
As to whether directors are liable for a violation of the charter
or acts beyond their authority, there is a division of opinion. One
line of authorities holds that directors are not liable for a violation
of the corporate charter where such violation was through mis-
take, unless of course, such mistake was occasioned by a failure
to exercise reasonable care. Hodges vs. New England Screw
Company, i R. I. 312.
Opposed to these cases are a line of decisions which hold that
when directors overstep their authority and authorize an act be-
yond their powers, they are liable "whether they acted negligently
T70
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or with due care, in bad faith or in good faith, honestly or fraudu-
lently." Holmes, Booth & Haydens vs. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75;
Cullerne vs. London, etc., Society, L. R. 25 Q. B. D. 485; Hill vs.
Murphy, 212 Mass. i.
The reason why directors are held to no more than ordinary
care and diligence is, because if more were required of them it
would become very difficult to find responsible persons to assume
the duties of directors. Campbell vs. Watson, 62 N. J. Eq. 396;
Carrington vs. Thomas C. Basstor Co., iii Md. 419.
The rule then is, that there is a fiduciary relationship, such as
exists between a trustee and cestui que trust, existing between
the directors and the corporation and stockholders. Since there
exists this peculiar trust relation between the directors and the
corporation and shareholders, the law holds the directors to the
utmost good faith in corporate transactions. Johnson vs. Stough-
ton Wagon Company, II8 Wis. 438. They are bound to secure
the best terms for the corporation and are forbidden to take part
in any transactions in which their interests are adverse to those
of the corporation. Moraweta, vol. I, section 517.
The common law rule held directors absolutely incapacitated
from dealing with their corporation. This strict rule held all
contracts between the directors and their corporation absolutely
void, regardless of their reasonableness or unreasonableness.
In the leading case of Aberdeen Railway Co. vs. Blaikie
Brothers, I Macqueen's App. Cas. 461, action was brought by
Blaikie brothers against the railway company for performance
of a contract whereby the railway company agreed to purchase
certain iron chairs from Messrs Blaikie. The defense set up was
that Thomas Blaikie was at the time the contract was entered into,
a director of the railway corporation and consequently inca-
pacitated from dealing with the corporation. The House of Lords
(1854) held the contract void without even considering whether
it was fair and reasonable. The principal case has been followed
in Metropolitan Elev. Railway Co. vs. Manhattan Elev. Railway
Co., ii Daly (N. Y.) 373; Duncomb vs. the N. Y. Housatonic &
Northern R. Co., 84 N. Y. i8o. In the latter case, the court approv-
ing of Aberdeen R. Co. vs. Blaikie Brothers, supra, said: "Nor is it
at all questioned that, in such cases, the right of the beneficiary, or
those claiming through him, to avoidance, does not depend upon
the question whether the trustee in fact has acted fraudulently
or in good faith and honesty, but it is founded on the known weak-
ness of human nature, and the peril of permitting any sort of col-
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lision between the personal interests of the individual and his duties
in his fiduciary character. I think therefore, that the undoubted
rule of law in this state is, that every contract entered into by a
director with his corporation may be avoided by the corporation
within a reasonable time, irrespective of the merits of the contract
itself." Thus in Higgins vs. Lansingh; 154 Ill. 3O, 4o N. E. 362,
it was held that where a corporation has secured the benefits of a
contract with a director for a period of nine years, it is thereby
estopped from recinding the contract, nine years being an un-
reasonable time.
In Hatch vs. Hatch, 9 Ves. 297, Lord Hardwicke said, "It is
not enough for the trustee to say, 'You cannot prove any fraud,'
as it is in his power to conceal it."
In Whelpdale vs. Cookson, i Ves. Sr. 8, Lord Jeffrey said, "It
is presumptio juris et de jure, that where a person stands in these
inconsistent positions of both buyer and seller, there are dangers,
and it is not relevant to say that it is impossible that there could
be any in the particular case."
The case of Higgins vs. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 3Ol, 40 N. E. 362,
adopts a slightly different rule in holding that the directors of a
corporation without the consent of the stockholders have no right
to contract for the corporation with themselves, or for the benefit
of themselves, and if they do contract without the sanction of the
stockholders, the contract may be avoided by the corporation or
its stockholders not consenting thereto, whether such contract ap-
pears to be fair or not.
The weight of authority, however, tends toward a more liberal
rule. This liberal rule regards contracts entered into by a director
with his corporation as voidable only. If the director has acted
in good faith in making the contract, if the contract is a fair and
reasonable one, if no undue advantage has been taken of the cor-
poration, the contract will be upheld. The court in determining the
validity of such contracts will inquire into two things, first, whether
the contract has been made in good faith, and secondly, whether it
is fair and reasonable. In the case of Fort Payne Rolling Mill vs.
Hill, 174 Mass. 224, 54 N. E. 532, the court found that the con-
tract made by the director with his corporation was made in good
faith and was not improvident. Justice Holmes in speaking for
the court said: "It (contract) was not illegal or void because
made with a director, the only person likely to be willing to make
it. In this country it very generally has been deemed impracticable
to adopt a rule which absolutely prohibits such contracts. Nye vs.
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Storer, I68 Mass. 53, 55. Whatever small conflict of interest be-
tween himself and the company there may have been, was no great-
er or other than that between a broker paid by a percentage and his
principal." Stratton vs. Allen, 16 N. J. Eq. 229; Twin Lick Oil
Co. vs. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587; Beach vs. Miller, 130 Ill. 162, 17
Am. St. 291; Pauly vs. Pauly, 107 Cal. 8, 48 Am. St. 98; Schnitt-
ger vs. Old Home, etc., Mining Co., 144 Cal. 603, 78 Pac. 9.
This question has been passed upon in Wisconsin in the case
of Spaulding vs. North Milwaukee Town Site Co., io6 Wis. 481,
in which our court held that the directors can deal with their cor-
poration (sell property) provided the transaction is fair and open
and made in good faith.
Directors are prohibited from using their positions of trust to
further their own private interests. Liquidators of Imperial Mir-
cantile Credit Assn. vs. Coleman, L. R. 6 Eng. and Ir. App. Cas.
189; Klein vs. Independent Brewing Assn., 231 Ill. 594, 83 N. E.
434; Landes vs. Hart, 131 App. Div. (N. Y.) 6, 115 N. Y. St. 337;
Parker vs. Nickerson, 112 Mass. 195; Timme vs. Kopmeier, 162
571.
An early New York case, Metropolitan Elev. Railway Co. vs.
Manhattan Elev. Railway Co., ii Daly 373, held that a contract
between two corporations having interlocking directors was in-
valid and void, on the ground that the allegiance of the directors
was divided and therefore it was impossible for them to serve the
interests of both corporations. This is not the prevailing rule. The
weight of authority is to the effect that contracts between corpora-
tions having interlocking directors are voidable only. If the con-
tract was entered into in good faith and is a fair and reasonable
one, the courts will uphold its validity. Corporations have the right
to deal with one another and they ought not to be deprived of this
right merely because they have directors common to both. Inter-
locking directors "owe the same degree of fidelity to both cor-
porations and there is no presumption that they will deal unfairly
with either." San Diego, etc., Co. vs. Pacific Beach Co., 112 Cal.
53, 44 Pac. 333; Adams Co. vs. Senter, 26 Mich. 73; McComb vs.
Barcelona, etc., Assn., 134 N. Y. 598, 31 N. E. 613; Leavenworth
Co. vs. Chicago R. Co., 134 U. S. 688.
While the cases are almost uniform in holding that the directors
stand in a fiduciary relation to the stockholders collectively, as a
unit, it seems that by the weight of authority the directors sustain
no such relation to the stockholders as individuals. Thus it is
held that where a director buys stock on the open market from a
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stockholder of the corporation, the director is acting in his indi-
vidual capacity and is not bound to disclose to the stockholder, any
facts affecting the value of the stock, of which he, the director,
may have knowledge.
The leading case on this subject is the case of Board of Comm.
of Tippecanoe County vs. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 15 Am. Rep. 245.
It appears in that case that the president of a corporation being
also director and having knowledge by reason of his official po-
sition, that the company's stock was worth more than the market
price, purchased stock from a shareholder without disclosing his
knowledge as to the real value of the stock. The court in holding
that the purchase was valid since there was no relation of trust
existing between the director and the individual stockholder, said:
"* * * for some purposes the directors of a corporation, stand
in a relation similar to that of trustees for the shareholders. This
seems to be the case with reference to the management, by
directors, of the property and general affairs of the corporation.
The matters are usually entrusted to the directors, and in respect
to which they are empowered to act, and their action affects the
whole body of shareholders, beneficially or injuriously, in respect
to dividends upon, or the value of, their stock. But stock in a
corporation held by an individual is his own private property,
which he may sell and dispose of as he sees proper, and over which
neither the corporation nor its officers have any control. It is
the subject of daily commerce and is bought and sold in market like
any other marketable commodity. The directors have no control
or dominion over it whatever or duty to discharge in reference
to its sale and transfer, unless it be to see that proper books and
facilities are furnished for that purpose." The decisions in accord
seem to go on the theory that the directors have absolutely no
control or dominion over the stock of the shareholders and have
no duties to perform with reference to the stock, which is the
private property of the individual stockholders.
All cases, however, recognize the liability of directors for actual
fraud in purchasing stock from the shareholders. Rothmiller vs.
Stein, 143 N. Y. 581.
The case of Carpenter vs. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, was an action
by a stockholder to have a sale of his stock to a director declared
void on the ground of fraud and undue influence. The court held
that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust did not exist be-
tween the director and the individual shareholder and that the
director was under no duty to disclose all facts within his knowl-
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edge material to the value of the stock, not known to the seller.
To the same effect are Bawden vs. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464, 98 N. E.
941 ; Stark vs. Soule, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 555.
The case of Krumbhaar vs. Grifiths, 151 Pa. St. 223, 25 At.
64; is directly in point. The action in that case was brought by
a stockholder for the purpose of rescinding a sale of stock to the
sectetary of the corporation. It appeared from the evidence that
at the time of the sale there were no fraudulent representations
as to the value of the stock, but a few days after the sale the
exercise of a certain option to lease, the existence of which was
known to both parties, caused the stock to increase in value. The
court held that as between the officer of the corporation and the
individual shareholder, there was no relation of trust or confi-
dence. "They dealt together simply as seller and purchaser of
the stock in question. * * * The mere fact that G. was an
officer of the company did not preclude him from buying the
plaintiff's stock. He had as much right to buy- it of the plaintiff
directly, provided he made no misrepresentations, and he took no
undue or unfair advantage, as to purchase the plaintiff's stock in
the open market, or through a broker."
Deaderick vs. Wilson, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) io8, held that the
directors and officers of a railway corporation have a "perfect
right" to purchase the shares of stockholders at less than par value,
and then sell them to another corporation at a profit.
Perry vs. Pearson, 135 Ill. 218, 25 N. E. 636, a case often cited,
is not directly in point, since in that case both parties to the sale
of stock were directors and were equally well acquainted with the
affairs of the corporation and any facts which might affect the
value of the stock.
But the rule laid down by the principal case, Board of Comm.
of Tippecanoe County vs. Reynolds, supre, has been repudiated
in several later cases. These cases work out a trust relation be-
tween the directors and individual stockholders. Thus in the
case of Oliver vs. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, P. 367-8, 45 S. E. 232, the
court said: "No process of reasoning and no amount of argument
can destroy the fact that the director is, in a most important and
legitimate sense, trustee for the stockholder. Jackson vs. Ludeling,
21 Wall. 616; 2 Pomm. Eq. Jur. (2d ed.) section iopo. Not a
strict trustee since he does not hold title to the shares; not even a
strict trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with his
cestui que trust; but a quasi trustee as to the shareholder's interest
in the shares. If the market or contract price of the stock should
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be different from the book valtie, he would be under no legal
obligation to call special attention to that fact; for the stockholder
is entitled to examine the books, and this source of information,
at least theoretically, is equally accessible to both. It might be
that a director is in possession of information which his duty to
the company requires him to keep secret; and if so, he must not
disclose the fact even to the stockholder; for his obligation to
the company overrides that to an individual holder of the stock.
* * * The very fact that he cannot disclose prevents him from
dealing with one who does not know, and to whom material in-
formation cannot be known. If, however, the fact within the
knowledge of the director is of a character calculated to affect the
selling price * * * the director before he buys, is bound to
make a full disclosure."
In Stewart vs. Harris, 69 Kansas 98, 77 Pacific 277, the court
in criticizing Board of Comm. of Tippecanoe County vs. Reynolds,
supra, says: "The position taken leaves the stockholder's interest
in the corporation and all matters affecting its value wholly in
charge and keeping of the managing officers of the corporation,
and leaves the stockholders their legitimate prey."
The case of Strong vs. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 53 L. ed. 853,
after considering both rules as to the relation existing between the
directors and the individual stockholders, does not directly affirm
either but holds that under the particular circumstances of that
case, "there was a legal obligation on the part of the defendant"
to make certain disclosures of facts affecting the value of the
stock purchased from the agent of the stockholder.
